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Abstract: This paper answers the question: has the Colombian Congress been effective at addressing
relevant water conflicts and making them visible? While courts and social movements have been
key for the advancement of social rights in Latin America, the role of legislators remains unclear. We
conduct content analysis of all water-related bills, proposed bills, and constitutional amendments
filed in Colombia from 1991 to 2020; we also analyzed Congress hearings of political control related to
water, and the statutes of political parties who hold majority of seats in Congress; we also conducted
interviews with key actors on water governance in Colombia. We find that only three bills have
passed in the 30-year time frame and that relevant water conflicts have not been addressed by
Colombian legislators. We find that water conflicts are not reaching the political agenda of Congress,
yet through political control hearings, it has given some late visibility to critical territorial conflicts in
which water is a key element. We analyze our data in light of literature on legislative politics and
legal mobilization in Latin America. This study adds to global research on the role of legislators in
advancing the human right to water, particularly in Latin America.
Keywords: right to water in Colombia; water conflicts; Congress; Latin American legislative dynamics
1. Introduction
Recent trends toward rights’ protections have focused on the role of courts and social
movements, but it is not clear what the role of political organs like Congresses is in this
context. In the Colombian case, during the framing of the 1991 Constitution the Colombian
Congress (hereafter the Congress) received criticism due to corruption and its lack of
effectiveness in addressing peoples’ needs [1]. Furthermore, key water conflicts have been
discussed at courts, and social movements do not seem to choose to focus their activism
on Congress to advance their cause. Despite this skepticism, the Congress still holds the
“power of the purse,” which is essential in ensuring rights’ protection, particularly when
it pertains to water rights. In this paper we determine whether the Congress has been
effective at addressing relevant water conflicts and making them visible in Colombia. When
it comes to unequal access to water in Latin America, governments have followed a model
of privatization and deregulation that has deepened the gap between national governments
and local communities [2–5]. Rural and indigenous communities have particularly suffered
from this disconnect and a growing skepticism towards the government has grown among
them [2,3,5]. Colombia is an example of these patterns where local dynamics and needs in
terms of water have not been addressed by national policy [6]. Thus, our paper provides
a case study of the Colombian context that will shed light on legislative dynamics in the
protection of the right to water with the goal of exploring narratives and avenues for other
Latin American countries who face similar challenges.
We focus on relevant water conflicts in Colombia, particularly inequities in water
distribution, threats of water pollution posed by economic activities like mining and
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agriculture, and the lack of clarity on what the right to water entails [6–8]. We analyze bills
and proposed constitutional reforms that the Congress has discussed starting in 1991, as
well as debates of political control promoted by Congress.
In Colombia there is not a free-standing right to water in the constitution, but the
Constitutional Court has upheld the right to water, based on its connection to other
constitutional rights [7,9–11]. The Constitutional Court has given rise to significant case
law on the right to water via tutela and it has relied heavily on the jurisprudence of the
Inter American Court of Human Rights and the General Comment No. 15 of the Committee
on Economic, Social, and Cultural rights [9].
Despite the jurisprudence by the Constitutional Court, the Office of the Ombudsperson
in Colombia has highlighted the absence of a body of legislation that unifies criteria on the
access to water and quality of water in the country; existing norms (laws and administrative
regulations) address these issues from the perspective of water as a utility, based on a
market logic that differs from a rights protection approach. The Ombudsperson has argued
that new legislation is required to solve this [6]. In addition to a dispersed body of norms,
the lack of budget to protect water rights and address people’s needs has also posed serious
challenges for the protection of the right to water.
While courts have been able to satisfy individual needs, it is necessary to design an
articulated and comprehensive water policy, with the budget to support it, and this is an
essential task that belongs to Congress. Furthermore, in Colombia it is unclear what the
content of the right is: merely having access to water or a right to potable water and its
distribution to all people in the country [7]. This lack of clarity requires the political will of
Congress to be clarified.
There have been several attempts to pass water rights’ bills and constitutional re-
forms to enshrine the right to water. All these attempts have been unsuccessful because
of tensions between political actors. The government has weighed-in in these debates,
arguing that there are serious difficulties for it to implement a future right to water. The
Ministry for Environmental Affairs has argued that the government cannot commit to a
legal obligation to develop the necessary infrastructure to bring access to water to popu-
lations in rural areas and small peripheral municipalities because it would be too costly
(Interviewee # 1). Legislators from political parties like Centro Democrático have also ar-
gued that although they support the enshrinement of a right to water in the Constitution,
financial sustainability is essential. Sen. Paloma Valencia (from Centro Democrático)
argued that bringing water to all areas of the country will be very expensive and thus
approving a minimum amount of free water for rural areas is not feasible. Legislative
debate: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9lm1oiUMEq8, accessed on 2 March 2021.
Minute 2:03. Amid these tensions, inequities in water distribution, low coverage for rural
areas, and the threats posed to water sources by economic activities show the relevance of
a legislative solution.
In this paper, we use qualitative content analysis of legislative documents from 1991
to 2018 that refer to the right to water. Our goal with this analysis is to explore whether
Congress as a key political organ has been focusing on relevant issues that could improve
people’s access to drinking water or if relevant water conflicts have not made it to the
political agenda. We identified key narratives and issues in these documents and compared
them with relevant water conflicts in Colombia that have been described in the literature.
We also explored the role of political parties by looking into the statutes of the main political
parties in Congress.
In addition to the legislative process, Congress also has a key role in political control
and has the power to exert pressure over the executive toward the implementation of water
policies. With this in mind, we also analyze hearings held in both chambers of the Congress
(Senado and Cámara de Representantes) on political control related to the right to water.
Content analysis has been largely used by legal scholars to systematically analyze judicial
rulings [12]. Scholars interested in legislatures have also used it to examine legislative
documents and study features such as party ideology, polarization, government positioning
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in legislative debates, and parliamentary scrutiny. For examples of the use of this method
for legislative studies see [13]. Our study follows recent advances in the use of this
methodology involving the use of legislative databases to examine parliamentary behavior.
Finally, we conducted nine interviews with relevant actors: leaders in environmental non-
profits in Colombia, advisers to Congress members, members of political parties, leaders
who manage local water plants, and academics.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Water Rights’ Protection in Latin America and Colombia
The human right to access “sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and
affordable water for personal and domestic uses” has recently been recognized at the
universal level. In 2002, by the General Comment No. 15 of the UN committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), and in 2010 by General Assembly Resolution 64/292.
General Comment No. 15 provides that States “have to adopt effective measures to realize,
without discrimination, the right to water” [9]. Despite these normative developments
at the international level, adequate and effective access to water continues to find many
obstacles both in developing and developed countries [9].
Brinks, Gauri, and Shen [14] claim that social rights are recognized at the international
level and further constitutionalized for use in domestic contexts, thus undergoing a process of
vernacularization through which they are adapted to the local context and get transformed by
it, which can have diverse results. Whether social rights enshrined in national constitutions
improve the actual living conditions of disadvantaged groups, or serve as a reinforcement of
the status quo, “depends on the outcome of this vernacularization process, rather than on any
a priori features of social rights language or social constitutionalism” [14] p. 289.
In the Latin American context several countries like Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia, and
Argentina have used constitutional reforms as mechanisms to strengthen rights protection
and strengthen democratic citizenship [15]. Since the 1970s, Latin America has undergone
three separate yet interrelated transformative processes: the wave of democratization, an
economic transition, and constitutional reforms to incorporate several social and economic
rights into their fundamental laws [16,17]. The latter is seen as “a bridge between the
greater participation in public life implied by democratization, and the diminished par-
ticipation in public goods implied by neoliberal reform” [16] p. 1948. As a consequence
of the Washington consensus, adopted by most of the countries of the region, national
governments enacted neoliberal market reforms that cut back on state-provided services
including utilities, public institutions, and welfare, and eased import restrictions [16]. A
consequence of these reforms was the growth in inequality and social crises that motivated
a new trend of constitutional strengthening rights’ protection [17].
These constitutional changes impacted legal practices and conceptions of the law in
the region with characteristics such as: (i) constitutions grant high courts greater powers;
(ii) constitutions entrench longer catalogs of social, economic, and cultural rights; and
(iii) international treaties have been granted constitutional status within the hierarchy of
norms at the national level [18] p. 3. Consequently, courts in many Latin American countries
gained prominent political roles as defenders of constitutional rights and mediators of
social policy conflicts [18].
Yet, even if some constitutions have stronger chapters on social and economic rights,
like Brazil’s 1998 and Colombia’s 1991 constitutions, considered as “typical social rights
constitutions” [19] p. 39, in general, Latin American constitutions have showed the limits
of constitutions to achieve social and economic transformation. Latin America is still the
most unequal region in the world [20], pointing to the shortfalls of constitutions rooted
in individual liberal human rights principles to challenge power structures and achieve
resource redistribution [17,20].
It is within this historical context of constitutionalism in the region that we place our
analysis in the role of the legislative in rights’ protection. For the analysis, we focus on
two elements: the legal framework and the political opportunities. The selection of these
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elements is embedded in the understanding of a constitutional amendment as a process of
‘legislative regulative lawfare’ [21], meaning a process of social political struggle, where
actors in the political society use the national parliament as an arena to advance or block a
contested political goal.
While judicialization and social movements have been key for the advancement of
social rights in Latin America through constitutionalism, the role of legislators remains
unclear. Following Rodríguez-Garavito & Rodríguez, to be progressively realized, social
rights need to be understood as fully enforceable rights before all state authorities, at all
levels of government. And to fully develop the normative ability of social rights there
needs to be progress in two important fronts: the semantic content and specific scopes of
each social right, and its legal enforceability [22].
The determination of the semantic field of rights serves to determine the minimum
obligations of public authorities in relation to each social right. Such a determination is
a task that must first be carried out by the legislative branch, who through the creation
of laws must determine specific content for each right. Legal scholarship is also needed,
because as progress is made at the theoretical level, progress can be made on a practical
level [22].
Luigi Ferrajoli [23] addressed the issue of the procedural enforceability of social rights,
noting that it would be necessary for public service laws not only to establish the content
and budgets of each social right, but also to identify public law subjects vested in the
correlative functional obligations, so that in the case of omissions or violations, injured
citizens can exercise their subjective rights [22] p. 69.
Although the role of Colombian constitutional judges has been key to advancing social
rights such as the right to health [24], the rights of persons internally displaced by the
armed conflict, environmental rights, and the social rights of inmates [25], regulating the
semantic content and scope of each right, including the appointment of duties and budget
to the administrative state, are structural reforms that correspond to the legislative branch;
without those reforms, the gap between the aspirational constitution and the reality of
many groups will become dangerously large.
2.2. Uses of Congress to Seek Legal Reform
Political representation is “the traditional concept of democracy for the nation-state” [26].
The demos is represented in a legislative body who makes laws and oversees the govern-
ment via hearings and inquiries. Legislative bodies can be Parliaments or Congresses.
Colombia has a congressional democracy where the executive branch is separate from the
legislative and the head of government, the president of the republic, is not a member of
the legislature [27] Arts. 113–115, 132–137. Ideally, the demos would be fairly represented
in Congress and social conflicts would be peacefully channeled through law making and
political control over the executive branch. In this paper we will explore whether the
Congress is fulfilling this role when it comes to water conflicts.
Scholars have focused on how legislators represent constituents and the extent to
which they should follow their mandate or face sanctions. Burke’s classical study claimed
that representatives served the constituency’s interest, but not its will. Miller and Stokes [28]
in their classic study called “Constituency Influence in Congress,” paralleled the issue of
representation with representative’s responsiveness to constituent opinion. They identified
two ways in which representation occurs: (i) electors assure that representatives will
follow the constituents’ will by electing someone with convictions like their own; and
(ii) representatives legislate according to their perception of the constituents’ opinion,
moved by the incentive of re-election [29].
In subsequent decades scholars of congressional representation traced people’s influ-
ence over their legislators using new methods. They found that constituents and public
opinion strongly influence the behavior of legislators as changes in public opinion shape
their choices. This pattern was called ‘dynamic representation’ by Stimson et al as cited
in [29,30].
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Another hypothesis is that politicians are unrepresentative as their choices may re-
spond as well to the interest of other actors, not their constituents, and thus, there needs to
be a distinction between representation and responsiveness. Donald Stokes called attention
to the fact that electors change their evaluation of representatives from one election to the
next, and thus a big part of what politicians do responds to their anticipation of public
opinion [29]. In studies of Latin American Susan Stokes has claimed that politicians act-
ing in the context of economic uncertainty and the risk of economic disaster during the
1990s responded to market rather than citizen actors, as they thought it was the way to be
evaluated as successful by the end of their terms [29].
Dominant interest groups can influence the policy process via political parties and
other already existing channels [31]. As McCann highlights, the law often offers greater
support to prevailing social relations and does not present incentives or resources for
other actors to challenge those relationships; virtually all scholars agree on this point [32].
When it comes to nonelite actors, their opportunities to influence policy reform are quite
the contrary; they are scarce. In analyzing them, Hilson has discussed the openness or
closedness of the political system as important factors to success.
Hilson looks at openness in terms of access to the institutions and mechanisms, not
only in general terms, meaning how political systems are as a whole, but also specifically
on the policy area and subarea concerned. For example, he says, “although the UK
administration is relatively open to environmentalists, it does not necessarily follow that
this will be true across all subareas of environmental policy” [33] p. 242. Further he points
out that when systems are closed, more protests erupt, and even structurally open systems
can be unreceptive to certain claims [32]. Besides the relative openness or closure of the
institutionalized political system, the literature also stresses three other dimensions of
political opportunity: “ (1) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments
that typically undergird a polity; (2) the presence or absence of elite allies; and (3) the
state’s capacity and propensity for repression” [34].
Following Tarrow, political opportunities are defined broadly as “consistent but not neces-
sarily formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage
or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements” [35] p. 54. In
other words, they refer to what affects the possibilities that challenging groups have to mo-
bilize effectively within a political system [36]. In this sense, opportunities are “options for
collective action, with chances and risks attached to them, which depend on factors outside
the mobilizing group” [37] p. 65. Tilly defined a social movement as a sustained series of
interactions between powerholders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf
of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make
publicly visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those
demands with public demonstrations of support [38] p. 306.
This definition has been criticized for being too general. Out of dissatisfactions over
the definition of social movements, some leading scholars use the term ‘contentious politics’
instead, considering it broader and more inclusive [39]. Tilly conceptualized opportunities
within a more comprehensive fivefold model that includes interests, organization, mobi-
lization, collective action, and opportunity. Here opportunity refers to the “relationship
between the population’s interests and the current state of the world around it” [40] p. 55,
and “the extent to which power, repression (and facilitation), and opportunity (and threat)
provide options for collective action” [36] p. 362. With this broad notion of political op-
portunity in mind, in the next section we address how it plays out in Latin American and
Colombian legislative dynamics.
2.3. How Do Political Issues Reach Congress
Steven Lukes disaggregates power in three angles: decision-making, agenda-setting,
and ideological power. He suggests the use of these criteria for the analysis of the effec-
tiveness of power in institutions. Decision-making power points out that those who can
make decisions have power, and the others do not. Majorities in Congress and the ruling
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party would be examples. For Lukes, this view fails to see how the political agenda is
controlled. Thus, according to the second face, those who can influence the agenda of
decision makers also have power. For example, interest groups, social movements, and
market actors. However, non-decisions are also a result of power relations [41].
When a stakeholder refrains from voicing an issue, foreseeing an unpleasant reaction
from other actors, ‘non-decisions’ consolidate the status quo of power relations. Further-
more, the exclusion of issues from the agenda can respond to the norms and biases of a
society in a given time and space, due to the prevailing modes of thought. Based on this,
Lukes suggests that power can have a deeper and more effective third dimension. This
dimension requires an underlying ideology based on which the status quo gains general
acceptance. He calls it the “supreme and most insidious exercise of power,” as it shapes
the preferences and perception of the masses according to the rulers’ view, and “prevent
them from having grievances” as they will “see or imagine no alternative” to the existing
order [41] p. 23.
2.4. The Role of Congress in the Protection to the Right of Water in Latin America
One of the key challenges that Latin American countries face is the deep inequalities
in access to resources. In this context, ensuring access to water of good quality to the entire
population is a universal need in Latin American countries [4]. This challenge is particularly
relevant due to its connection with human rights protection and other essential values like
ensuring a sustainable development of these countries [4]. Although there is agreement
on the need to protect the right to water, how to do it is far from being uncontested.
Starting in the 90s Latin American governments adopted privatization and deregulation
of water services with the goal of improving water governance; donors and international
organizations (e.g., the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) have fostered
this model by setting conditions on countries toward privatizing their systems for water
provision [4,42].
After years of experience, it has become clear that the model has led to increased
inequalities in the access to potable water and has led to large environmental damages
since accountability mechanisms are weaker on private contractors [4]. An example of
this pattern is Chile where indigenous and farmers’ movements have seen privatization
and deregulation as threats to their water rights and their own management systems,
leading to mixed results in terms of water governance [42]. More recent approaches to
water governance are moving toward more participatory models of decision-making and
management that involve different sectors of the population [42].
The role of Latin American Congresses in the protection of the right to water has two
characteristics: disarticulation between policy makers (at the legislative and executive) at
the national level and local communities, and the development of legislation that follows
technocratic and privatization models.
The disarticulation between policymakers at the national level and local communities
exist because water legislation in Latin America has been designed favoring general rules
that do not take into consideration local water management contexts and experiences [42].
Given the limitations of infrastructure and access to governmental services in rural areas,
communities have designed their own customary rules and management systems that
often are not recognized by decision-makers at the national level [3]. This situation has
led to the coexistence of official law and customary law in water management and thus
to a situation of legal pluralism that limits the role of Congresses in legal reform and
intervention strategies [42]. A good example of this disarticulation is found in Peru where
leaders in the Peruvian highlands have seen the adoption of water licenses and tariffs as
the start of water privatization, which they deem morally wrong; one possible reaction
is for these communities to neglect the payment of the tariff or license, but not as an act
of resistance to governmental intervention but just a prioritization of needs and scarce
resources [3].
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The second characteristic is that legislation related to water has embraced a techno-
cratic and top-down approach that has excluded social participation from water manage-
ment [2]. At the same time, the participation of private parties in water service provision
has increased the perception of corruption and has brought evidence that this policy pro-
tects the interests of transnational corporations at the cost of people’s needs, social protests,
and sometimes violence [2]. An example of these laws is the Water Resources Law in Peru
that limited the role of the government in economic and social politics and opened up a
wider space for private companies to intervene and invest in water policy [3].
These characteristics of the role of Congresses have particularly affected indigenous
communities and populations in rural areas, given that their participation in policy design
has been minimal [2]. In countries like Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile the role of national
governments in water governance has not been effective at protecting people’s access to
water in rural areas and in indigenous territories [42]. Despite the challenge, more recent
trends have shown indigenous movements strengthening their participation in national
organs of decision-making [42]. Also, successful social mobilizations in countries like
Bolivia (the Cochabamba Water War, 1999–2000) and Uruguay (the Constitutional reform
of 2004) have ignited similar movements in countries like Colombia, where social actors
like farmers, Afro-Colombians, youth, and women’s and indigenous groups mobilized to
advance initiatives like a water referendum in 2007 [2].
2.5. The Right to Water in Colombia and Its Challenges
Despite the lack of a free-standing constitutional right to water in the 1991 Constitu-
tion of Colombia [27], by relying on regional and international norms and jurisprudence
the Constitutional Court has upheld the right to water, based on its connection to the
constitutional right to a healthy environment (Art. 79), the constitutional right to life (Art.
11), and the collective right to public health (Art. 88) [7,9–11]. According to the Court, the
observations and recommendations of institutions authorized to interpret ratified human
rights treaties are relevant to interpret constitutional rights in Colombia [9].
According to the Court, what goes beyond the essential content of the right to water
(e.g., availability, accessibility, and quality) depends on its implementation via public poli-
cies, but constitutional judges can analyze whether there has been negligence in resource
management and should foster citizen engagement [9]. Some principles applied by the
Court regarding the right to water are the principles of solidarity and humility. The prin-
ciple of solidarity applies to the environment, so economic development should follow
sustainable development models (Art. 80) [9]. The principle of humility should be applied
to the extent that human beings depend on nature and thus nature should be considered
beyond the notion of exploitable resource [9].
The Court has used the right to water to protect ecosystems and water sources. For
example, in Decision C-035/16 [43], the Court struck down provisions of Law 1450 of
2011 and of Law 1753 of 2015 about mining permits in high-altitude ecosystems called
paramos. The court noted several key features of paramo ecosystems, including their role
in supplying Colombia with around 70% of its drinking water. In Decision T-622/2016
(Atrato river case) [44], the Court declared the violation of the right to water (among other
rights), of ethnic minorities affected by the pollution of the Atrato river due to uncontrolled
mining. Finally, the Court has protected the right to water of individuals in conditions of
vulnerability due to illness or scarcity, for instance by ordering water service reconnections
despite lack of tariffs payments, fraudulent connections, and illegal reconnections. Despite
their individual nature these cases contribute to the development and understanding of a
right to water for the rest of the population [8].
The “criteria of interpretation of the content and scope of the right to water have
relied primarily on the jurisprudence of the Inter American Court of Human Rights and
the General Comment No. 15 of the CESCR” [9] p. 345. “Since decision T-760/2008 [45],
there are minimum contents that make up the right to water, corresponding with the core
obligations set out in General Comment Number 15, as in Decisions T-207/95 [46] and
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SU-1116/01 [47]” in [9]. The constitutional jurisprudence has mainly protected the right
to access water of people with unpaid water supply bills, in which cases it has ordered
reconnections. In response to collective litigation (acciones populares) the Colombian Council
of State (Consejo de Estado) has ordered the construction of sewage and sanitation systems
in low-income villages [48].
The literature has documented key water conflicts in Colombia. Despite Colombia’s
rich water resources, it faces serious problems when it comes to water availability and
water quality. The first challenge is coverage and the deep inequalities in water access,
particularly between urban and rural areas. According to the Ombudsperson’s Office
of Colombia, 69% of Colombian municipalities lack water without risk for human con-
sumption and the poorest municipalities have less access to potable water without any
level of risk [7,10,49]. An important determinant of water quality is the purchasing power
of its inhabitants, which allows them to pay the maintenance fees of the infrastructure
and generate profits [49]. There is also evidence of “environmental racism” in Colombia
where the non-white population and racial minorities face worse environmental conditions.
Empirical data show that a main predictor for environmental racism in individuals is their
income, rather than race [49].
Private providers have filled in the gap, bringing water to those areas of the country
where the government does not reach. Particularly, community-managed water plants
have been key in ensuring access to water for rural communities or lower-income groups
in the outskirts of urban areas. According to the Ministry for Environmental Affairs there
is not an accurate count on how many people have access to water from these providers,
but there is an estimate that 11,200 community water plants (acueductos comunitarios) exist
in Colombia [10]. Around three quarters of the Colombian population live in urban areas
while one quarter lives in rural areas (76% urban population and 24% rural) [50].
The second water challenge in Colombia relates to water conservation in what pertains
to economic activities like agriculture and mining. Sustainable agriculture is a key point in
the economic agenda for Colombia in a way that protects the interests of communities now
and in the future [7]. “Water is critical for agricultural production. Irrigated agriculture
represents 20% of the total cultivated land and contributes 40% of the total food produced
worldwide. Irrigated agriculture is at least twice as productive” [51]. Currently, agriculture
accounts for around 70% of all freshwater withdrawals globally [51].
Coal and gold mining have caused serious negative impacts on the environment,
especially on water resources [52]. Favorable economic conditions in international markets
of minerals have encouraged legal and illegal exploitation in Colombia and these activities
have increased significantly [52]. Another factor that has fostered illegal mining is the weak
structure and articulation of administrative and financial authorities that could enforce
environmental regulations or safety standards, posing serious challenges on human rights
like water, a healthy environment, ecological balance, sustainable development, food
security, and ecosystem conservation, among some other rights [4].
Current regulations on the right to water and its protection are not supplying an
effective framework to address these challenges. There is not an autonomous and concen-
trated body of norms that protect water quality and availability for the population. What
refers to water quality and distribution has been mainly regulated from the perspective of
public utilities with an emphasis on neoliberal models that have shaped the relationship
between the people (the consumers of this public utility) and the water companies. The
Ombudsperson has called on Congress and the executive trying to convey the need for a
legislative solution to these issues [5]. Recent initiatives like the referendo por el agua (water
referendum) tried to solve this issue and proposed an approach to water which treats it as
more than just a utility. This Referendum contemplated an obligation for the government
to protect water in all its dimensions, including its cultural and sacred dimension that
is particularly relevant for indigenous communities [7]. This Referendum also tried to
clarify the content of the right to water in terms of water quality and its distribution [7].
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Unfortunately, the Referendum drowned during its course through the Congress [53]. We
will expand on this issue in the analysis section.
3. Materials and Methods
In this paper we explore whether the Congress has been effective at making water
conflicts visible and whether it has addressed those conflicts. To answer this question, we
conducted a qualitative content analysis of all the bills, proposed bills, and constitutional
reforms related to “water” and that were analyzed by the Congress between 1991 and 2020.
Content analysis has been widely used to analyze court cases [12] and legislative documents.
The role of legislators in implementing human rights with a focus on environmental issues
has been broadly studied, especially in the US. We use a qualitative approach to better
understand the role of legislators in advancing the human right to water in highly unequal
and politically divided regions [2], where budget allocation for advancing social rights is
often prevented by unclear mechanisms. We use Colombia as a case study and offer a thick
description in structural connection with regional dynamics. This study contributes to the
aggregated analysis of progress and problems in the implementation of water rights in
the globe.
We used the search terms: ‘agua’ (water), ‘derecho al agua’ (right to water), ‘dere-
cho humano al agua’ (human right to water). We identified 29 proposed bills, 5 pro-
posed constitutional reforms, and 3 bills by using the search engine of the Senado and
Cámara. https://www.Senado.gov.co/index.php/az-legislativo/proyectos-de-ley and
http://www.Camara.gov.co/buscador-legislativo (accessed on 24 March 2021). We iden-
tified 2 more documents (1 proposed constitutional reform and 1 proposed bill) in pub-
lications of professional associations and the website of one Congress member. https:
//icpcolombia.org/, https://angelicalozano.co/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/La-Ley-
del-Agua-en-Colombia.pdf?x66374 (accessed on 24 March 2021). In total, we identified
39 documents (we describe these data in the analysis section). We analyzed these data and
identified key actors in these discussions (either because they supported or opposed the
bills), and whether the issues addressed in these bills matched substantial water issues that
have been documented in the literature.
We also analyzed the role of political parties in the discussions of these bills by
analyzing the statutes of the main political parties that have representation in Congress.
Currently, 13 political parties have representation in Congress. We analyzed the statutes
of the five largest represented political parties in each chamber. In addition to this, we
included in our analysis the Partido Verde (Green Party) because it is the only political
party that was founded with the goal of protecting the environment. In total we analyzed
the statutes of seven political parties (Centro Democrático, Partido Cambio Radical, Partido
Conservador Colombiano, Partido Liberal Colombiano, Partido de la U, Alianza Verde, and Partido
Social de la Unidad).
We also gathered data on the debates of political control that have been held either
in the Senado or Cámara. There is not a database that centralizes the information on these
debates, so we used interview data to identify key debates that have been held in the last
three years.
Finally, we conducted nine interviews with relevant actors: leaders in environmental
non-profits in Colombia, advisers to Congress members, members of political parties,
leaders who manage local water plants, and academics. IRB Protocols #HS-2018-416
and HS2021-4570 Tennessee State University We analyzed these data and identified key
narratives that we used to interpret other data described in this section.
4. Results
4.1. Legal and Regulatory Framework
When the 1991 Colombian Constitution was approved, there were deep doubts among
key actors about whether Congress could lead the institutional change that the Consti-
tutional Assembly was calling for, mostly due to rampant corruption, clientelism, and
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‘old politics’ practices that Congress embodied [11]. Thus, Congress was one of the key
problems of the 1991 Constitutional reform, and one that was addressed by trying to replace
the role of Congress with direct participation (i.e., referendums), regulatory (nonpolitical)
agencies, and the courts that could push change as an alternative to Congress [11]. Despite
this skepticism, Congress holds a key role when it comes to approving public budgets and
the four-year plan that governments follow. When it comes to water Congress has debated
initiatives proposed by Congress members, the people, and the government. In this section
we will describe the legal and regulatory framework of the right to water and the initiatives
that have been proposed to address water conflicts in the country.
In the case of the Colombian Constitution, the right to water is not stated as an
individual right. Yet, since 2008 the constitutional case-law has protected the right to
water to individuals in particular situations, such as: cases of supply interruption due to
debts to the company supplying the public service, fraudulent connections, and illegal
reconnections, among others [8]. There are two tendencies in the judicial recognition of the
right to water as a right. One is its guarantee by the connection theory (the right to water
is protected when connected to other fundamental rights such life and health), and the
other is its designation “as an autonomous fundamental right restricted to the minimum
amount necessary to survive” [8]. In sum, judicial protection has been granted in cases
of proved lack of access by individuals considered subjects of special protection due to
socioeconomic vulnerability or illness.
The water legal framework is provided in three laws: (1) Decree-Law 2811 of 1974 (The
National Code of Renewable Natural Resources and Environmental Protection); (2) Law
99 of 1993 (created the National Environmental System-SINA for its acronym in Spanish),
assigning functions to central and decentralized administrative institutions, and (3) Law
142 of 1994 (Ley de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios/Public Housing Services Law). While
there is a Regulatory Agency for Water and Sanitation (CRA, for its acronym in Spanish)
attached to the Ministry of Housing, there is no national agency devoted integrally to all
aspects of water protection and use. Currently several public organizations engage in water
governance. Examples of these organizations are the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of
Housing (with a specific office for water and sanitation), the Ministry of Environment, and
the Ministry of Agriculture.
Law 142 of 1994 (Ley de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios/Public Housing Services Law)
assigns roles both to the state and to the private sector and allows public-private part-
nerships for water provision and management. Besides, the Superintendence for Public
Housing Services (Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios) oversees the perfor-
mance of the public services providers and their compliance with regulations issued by
CRA [7,54].
Apart from state institutions and private providers, Colombian organized rural com-
munities have also provided potable water as a public utility and managed it as a common-
pool resource [48,55]. User-run community aqueducts have been described as place-based,
not-for-profit, culturally attuned alternatives to the binary State or Corporate model of
water supply [2].
Finally, at the national level there is an administrative regulation (Resolution 2115/2007)
that regulates water quality; the national government also created the System for protection
and Control of Water Quality (Decree 1575/2007 and Resolution 2115/2007 [49].
4.2. Political Parties’ Statutes
We analyzed whether parties with seats in Congress prioritized water and included
them in their statues in the period 2018–2022. We analyzed statutes of the following political
parties: Partido Liberal, Partido de la U, MIRA (acronym for Independent Movement of
Absolute Renewal), Partido Conservador, Mais, Farc, Polo Democrático, Cambio Radical,
Alianza Verde, and Centro Democrático.
In our analysis of 10 statutes of political parties with representation in Congress we
found that only one party—MIRA—mentions the term “water.” The political party MIRA
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is a Colombian confessional party founded in the year 2000. Its statutes outline a declara-
tion of program principles in four programmatic axes, one of which is called “adequate
habitat and environment” [56]. It says that the party pursues a safe environment through
mitigating climate change, moving toward sustainable development, improving economic
conditions, and reducing morbidity and mortality rates, which depend on the conservation
of natural resources, in particular on improving air quality, the availability of drinking
water, increasing the availability of arable soils and the conservation of biodiversity.
The other nine statutes focus on the political values and ideologies that guide them,
but none of them explicitly refer to environmental matters or water rights. This shows that
most of the political parties with representation in Congress do not see water as relevant to
be included in their statutes or as a priority to guide their role. In interviews with three
congressional advisers (Interviewees # 7, 8 and 9), they confirmed this finding by saying
that environmental damage and specifically the contamination of water sources is not
interpreted as a fact of severe political importance by majorities nor by institutions. One of
our interviewees said, “one of our problems is that people associate environmental harm
and even environmental crimes with ‘that is not a big deal’, ‘that is normal’. Environmental
sanctions in Colombia are laughable, there is a high rate of impunity for environmental
harm” (Interviewee # 8).
Another interviewee said “The issue of how environmental harm is perceived is
fundamental to how we deal with environmental conflicts in Colombia. That perception
here is so precarious, so vague, that basically conflicts are not resolved through institutions,
but the general understanding is that paying attention to an environmental conflict is a
favor done to someone. To congresspersons, or anyone supporting a community, it is as if
communities are begging them “please help us protect this wetland,” or “please help us,
the swamp (ciénaga) where our water comes from is being contaminated by the state-owned
Ecopetrol (Spanish acronym for Colombian Oil Corporation) refinery” (Interviewee # 8).
This finding relates to Hilson’s [33] observation of the possible openness of political
systems, but nonetheless a lack of receptivity to certain issues that do not make it to the
political agenda. Colombia’s legislative system is designed in such a way that it is accessible
to the discussion of water-related legal reform because potentially Congress members could
propose bills about it, but this issue is not the flag of any political party, not even of the
parties with a tendency toward environmental defense (Interviewees # 7, # 8 and # 9).
Lukes [41] points out, for his part, that not all issues reach the agenda of the elites in
power, because even if certain issues are important, as water is, parties do not necessarily
defend them due to an ideological distance from those discourses and causes. Although
some legislators may have an invested interest in water rights, the ideological environment
of rejection or evasion of water as a political issue leads to the non-discussion of water
rights and key water conflicts in Congress. This was supported by one of our interviewees,
who said: “Apart from problems with water access there is a huge problem with water
pollution, which does not get enough attention, because no one in Congress is particularly
interested in saying that water is contaminated and that we need more treatment plants.
I think the reason for this is that this is not a selling issue. It is very difficult to find a
congressperson who speaks about water and says, ‘this is a key problem in Colombia’,
there is no one. No congressperson is weaving that flag, the flag of care for water or of
decontamination of water sources” (Interviewee # 7). These data show that water rights
are not at the core of political parties’ priorities.
4.3. Bills and Proposed Constitutional Amendments
There have been a series of legal reform attempts and social mobilization since 2002,
seeking a wider protection of water and the right to access drinking water, including a
minimum amount of water for all.
Bills and proposed amendments of the constitution on water focus on different issues
(Table 1). Table 1 shows that of a total of 39 legislative documents related to water since
1991 only three bills have passed. Table 2 shows a total of 36 documents, rather than 39. The
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reason for this difference is that three proposed bills turned into bills (they were approved
by Congress) and in this table we counted these three proposed bills and approved bills
in the same row. Information on the proposed bills is available in column six, “status.”
These three bills are Bill 1176 of 2007, Bill 373 of 1997, and Bill 1977 of 2019. Bill 373
of 1997 created an obligation for departments and cities to adopt a program toward the
effective use of water and reduction of consumption. This program will be part of the
environmental plan for each region and city, and it will be designed for 5-year periods
every time. Interestingly, this Bill requires departments and cities to include education
campaigns to engage communities in the goal of reducing water waste and they should
designate the necessary budget to fund these activities. Bill 1176 of 2007 regulates the
general budgetary division system which is a fund toward public services and utilities that
the government should provide (Constitutional Art. 356).
Table 1. Summary of bills (B), proposed bills (PB) and proposed constitutional reforms (PCR) per issue. Designed by
the authors. Data from http://www.secretariaSenado.gov.co/ and http://www.Camara.gov.co/buscador-legislativo,
accessed on 24 March 2021.
Topic n per Issue Reference No. Year Document Type Status
To recognize and regulate the
human right to water in the
Constitution
9
Docket No. 15 November 2007
N◦ Senado: 197/07 (Defensoría) 2007 PB Not Passed
Docket No. N◦ Cámara: 047/08 2008 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 14 October 2008
N◦ Cámara: 171/08 2008 PB Not Passed
Docket No. Cámara: 054/2008 2008 PCR Not Passed
Docket No. 8 August 2012
Senado: 066/12 2012 PCR Not Passed
Docket No. 16 March 2016
Senado: 011 / 201, Cámara: 260/16 2016 PCR Not Passed
Docket No. 25 July 2018
Senado: 06 / 2018, Cámara: 234/18 2018 PCR Not Passed
Docket No. 22 March 2017
Senado: 14/2017 Cámara: 282/17 2017 PCR Not Passed
Docket No. 20 July 2018
Cámara: 009/2018 2018 PCR Not Passed
Sustainable use of water
(Recycling, treatment,
rainwater collection and
rational use of potable water)
2
Docket No. 26 July 2017
N◦ Senado: 048/17 2017 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 28 August 2018
N◦ Senado: 116/18 2018 PB Not Passed
Free minimum access to
drinking water 5
Docket No. 06 December 2012
N◦ Senado: 174/12 2012 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 20 July 2013
N◦ Senado: 009/13 2013 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 27 July 2018
N◦ Senado: 057/18 2018 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 27 July 2020
N◦ Senado: 168/20 2020 PB
Pending for first
debate in Senado
Docket No. 09 October 2020
N◦ Senado: 321/20 2020 PB
Pending for first
debate in Senado
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Table 1. Cont.
Topic n per Issue Reference No. Year Document Type Status




Bill No. 373 of 1997 1997 B Passed (PB DocketNo. 23 August 1995)
Docket No. 16 October 2003
N◦ Senado: 029/04 N◦ Cámara: 150/03 2003 PB Not Passed
Bill No. 1176 of 2007 2007 B Passed (PB DocketNo. 24 March 2007)
Docket No. 25 September 2008
N◦ Cámara: 150/08 2008 PB Not Passed
Ecotourism and protection
of hot springs 4
Docket No. 14 August 2014
N◦ Senado: 065/14 2014 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 19 August 2015
N◦ Senado: 062/15 2015 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 26 July 2017
N◦ Senado: 037/17 2017 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 20 March 2019
N◦ Senado: 241/19 2019 PB Not Passed
Integral and sustainable
fishing and aquaculture in
water sources
3
Docket No. 28 September 2010
N◦ Senado: 159/10 2010 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 25 August 2010
N◦ Senado: 126/10 2010 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 21 July 2014
N◦ Senado: 025/14 N◦ Cámara: 183/15 2014 PB Not Passed
Protection of groundwater
and aquifers 2
Docket No. 1 August 2012
N◦ Senado: 057/12 2012 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 16 October 2013
N◦ Senado: 126/13 N◦ Cámara: 20 June 2014 2013 PB Not Passed
Provision of drinking water
through community-based
systems
1 Docket No. 20 July 2013N◦ Senado: 018/13 2013 PB Not Passed
Water as a public utility 3
Docket No. 28 August 2002
N◦ Senado: 063/02 2002 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 01 August 2012
N◦ Senado: 061/12 2012 PB Not Passed
Bill No. 1977 of 2019 2017 B Passed (PB DocketNo. 8 November 2017)
Mining and water
protection 3
Docket No. 22 April 2008
N◦ Senado: 278/08 2008 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 5 August 2019
N◦ Senado: 094/19 2019 PB Not Passed
Docket No. 20 July 2020




This fund accounts for resource inequalities among cities and departments (adminis-
trative units conformed by a group of municipalities) and allows the national government
to distribute resources among them with specific goals. Bill 1176 states that funds in the
system will go to four item lines: education, healthcare, water, and sewage, and a general
fund (Art. 1, Bill 1176). Funds toward water and sewage will be distributed among cities
and departments based on five criteria: deficit in coverage of water and sewage services,
population who was access to water services, efforts by the local or department govern-
ment to expand water coverage, and fiscal efficiency (art. 7, Bill 1176). Finally, Bill 1977
modifies Bill 1176 and creates a unified system to report information about water service
and coverage in the country.
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Table 2. Water bills, proposed bills and proposed constitutional reforms per quadrennium. Designed
by the authors. Data from http://www.secretariaSenado.gov.co/ and http://www.Camara.gov.co/









1994–1998 0 0 1 1
1998–2002 1 0 0 1
2002–2006 1 0 0 1
2006–2010 5 1 1 7
2010–2014 8 1 0 9
2014–2018 6 2 0 8
2018–2022 6 2 1 9
Total 27 6 3 36
These bills highlight the responsibility of departments and cities in the protection of
the right to water, and they aim to articulate this responsibility with the necessary funds
to achieve this goal. Despite these policy efforts, legislation has not addressed key water
conflicts described in the literature review like pollution, threats posed by mining and
agriculture, and water coverage. There is little that city and department governments can
achieve just depending on resources of the Sistema General de Participaciones (SGP), which is
a national system for budget transfers [57], particularly due to the necessary infrastructure
to grant effective access to water for populations in rural areas.This system is constituted by
the resources that the Nation transfers to the territorial entities (departments, districts and
municipalities) by mandate of articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution., for the financing of
the services under their charge, such as health, education and those defined in Article 76 of
Law 715 of 2001.
One proposed bill that is highly relevant is Docket No. Cámara 171 of 2008 “por medio
de la cual se convoca a un Referendo Constitucional para consagrar el derecho al agua potable como
fundamental” (that calls for a constitutional referendum to enshrine the right to water).
This proposed bill was filed after 2,039,000 citizens (over 5% of the registered voters in
Colombia at the time) signed to express their support to this bill that would call on a
referendum to reform the constitution (Congress Gazette No. 717, 2008). According to
the Colombian Constitution, Congress should pass a bill approving the referendum that
has been supported by the people. Although Docket 171 relied on the required popular
support, it drowned in Congress due to procedural reasons: it was not approved by Senado
and Cámara within the legislature.
One interviewee argued that despite all efforts, as the end of the year approached
the Docket did not gather the necessary support from Congress members and, just like
that, it drowned (Interviewee # 1). Another reason why this initiative was not successful
in Congress is due to the existence of several other referendum initiatives that saturated
the attention of the legislators, including the referendum call for a third re-election of
ex-president Alvaro Uribe. 2008 was a year in which issues around security and the armed
conflict were protagonists, leaving no space for the debate of other polemic and anti-private
corporations involved in the water sector, such as the water referendum. This is a dramatic
example of a proposed bill supported by legal mobilization that was filtered by Congress;
in this case the filter did not come as loud voices against the right to water, but rather by
the lack of engagement by Congress members in this issue.
All the proposed amendments to the constitution have focused on enshrining the
right to water (n = 6), but none of them has passed. Interview data suggest that it will be
costly to constitutionalize the right to water in Colombia because of the role of courts in
rights’ protection (Interviewee # 8 and Interviewee # 9). The government has been open
about the limited financial resources that the country has to expand water coverage and
that the constitutionalization of the right to water will put the country on the spot with an
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obligation that it cannot fulfill. Also, interest groups, particularly private businesses with
an interest in economic activities like mining, have exerted strong lobblies in Congress to
push water rights out of the political agenda (Interviewee # 8 and Interviewee # 9).
Table 1 summarizes broad categories of topics in the bills, proposed bills, and proposed
constitutional reforms we found. The majority of these documents focus on recognizing
and regulating the human right to water (n = 9); discussions on free minimum access to
drinking water is the second topic with five proposed bills in our data. So far none of these
initiatives has been approved and two are pending for debates in Senado. This table includes
summarized information on bills, proposed bills, and proposed constitutional reforms.
Table 2 shows when proposed bills, and proposed amendments to the constitution
were filed. Congress members are elected for four years in terms that match the presidential
term. It is noticeable that in only two years of the most recent legislature, Congress has
discussed nine documents related to water; this matches the number of documents debated
in the 2010–2014 term. In 2010 the President elected was Juan Manuel Santos (from Partido
de la U); this same political party held the majority of seats in both Senado and Cámara. It is
worth noting that in 2010 the UN passed Resolution 64/292 recognizing access to clean
water and sanitation as an independent human right. Our data show a pattern of growth
starting in 2006, before the UN was approved.
According to the Colombian legislation, individual Congress members or a group
of them can propose a bill for discussion (Art. 140, Law 5, 1992) while to file a proposal
for a constitutional amendment it is necessary to have the support of 10 members of
Congress [27] in Art. 375. Proposed bills and constitutional amendments regulating water
rights were filled by different political parties. See Table 3.
Table 3. Proposed water bills and constitutional amendments per political party. Designed by
the authors.
Political Party Proposed Bills andConstitutional Amendments
Alianza Verde 11
Partido Liberal 8








Alianza Social Independiente (ASI) 3
Colombia Justa Libres 2
Sociedad civil—Comité de Promotores del Referendo Constitucional
para consagrar el derecho al agua potable como fundamental 1
Movimiento Unidad Indígena y popular por Colombia—MUIPC 1
FARC 1
Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia (AICO) 1
For example, a senator representing Movimiento Social Indígena (Indigenous Social
Movement) filed three times, in three different years, a bill to regulate and protect the
environmental sustainability of hot springs (Senado 062/15, Congress Gazette 605/15;
Senado: 037/17, Congress Gazette 627/17; Senado 065/14, Congress Gazette 422/14). In
these proposed bills the goal was to encourage a sustainable use of water springs that could
bring ecotourism to country areas and protect water resources.
In Colombia there is no national law recognizing and regulating a minimum amount
of water as a fundamental right. There have been unsuccessful initiatives and proposals for
constitutional and legal reforms in this sense, including one proposed in 2018 by the Green
Coalition. This bill seeks to present free access to 20 m3 of water per month to the more
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disadvantaged population (levels 1 and 2 of the Colombian socioeconomic stratification
system). It also enshrines water as a human right and seeks to establish rainwater as a
public good. Although some municipal governments have included the provision of a free
amount of water in their programs, as has happened in Medellin (2008), Bogota (2012), and
Bucaramanga (2013), these have not been permanently institutionalized. Four of the legal
reform projects revised for this study have sought the provision of a minimum amount of
free water for the most vulnerable population.
In 2012 and 2013 there were two legal reform proposals. The 2012 bill proposed by the
Liberal and U parties, sought for municipalities to adopt a vital minimum of 50 to 100 L of
water per day per person. The idea was for beneficiaries to have access to the same services
they would have if they had accessed judicial instances. This minimum drinking water
and sewerage program was to be financed by the municipalities or districts and serve a
group of beneficiaries determined in a program adopted by the municipality. This project
did not aspire to reform the 142, but to separate “the business scheme of provision of the
service foreseen in Law 142, of the social policies on water provision as public service that
correspond to the State” (project 16, Senado: 174/12, p. 3).
The 2013 MIRA party proposal sought an amount of 6 m3/month per consumption
unit to be granted free of charge for people living in areas classified in levels one and two
of the Colombian socioeconomic stratification system (low-income communities accessing
higher subsidies to cover access to public services), including water for residential and
mixed use. This proposal included a free minimum of water, electricity, sewerage system,
and telephone access, as part of a “vital basket” (canasta vital). The proposal mentioned
the vial minimum to be an application of the right to water, declared by Resolution 64/292
of 28 July 2010 of the General Assembly of the United Nations. This bill was grounded
on the need to find a structural response to the growing number of users disconnected
from water supply services for lack of payment. It sought to create a bottom-up solution in
which the current subsidies were kept, but that in addition the State arbitrates sufficient
resources to be able to meet the needs of users. See Table 4.
Table 4. Proposed bills and constitutional amendments to establish a minimum amount of free water.




Ensuring that the population with least resources
(stratification 1 and 2) has access to a vital minimum of
water (20 m3). It also enshrines that water as a human
right and rain as a public good.
P15. Senado: 009/13
Party: MIRA
Vital basket of energy, water, sewerage, home gas and
telecommunications for low-income people.
P16 Senado: 174/12
Parties: Liberal and U.
Minimum vital amount of water “Program to be
adopted by the municipality, within the range of 50 to
100 L per day per person.” It seeks to present
beneficiaries with access to the same services they
would have had if they had filed a suit.
PRC 1. Bill No. 171 2008
(water referendum)
Proposed by civil society organizations
Declaring the right to water as fundamental, to
establish a minimum amount of free water, and
excluding private companies from drinking water
provision, leaving the service only to state owned
companies and to community-based water providers.
It is noticeable that despite the reality of inequality in the access to water between
urban and rural areas, this issue is not being directly addressed by new legislation nor
constitutional reforms. Furthermore, since the majority of these documents provide general
protections that apply equally to both sectors, they could perpetuate the disparities in the
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protection of the right to water by not acknowledging the specific challenges and needs
that rural areas face.
Some general rules have addressed relevant issues, but these issues have been ad-
dressed by localities before. Congress intervention does not seem essential. For example,
the granting of a minimum amount of free water. Although it is possible that these bills
when approved give leverage to individuals both in rural and urban areas to advocate for
their needs and advance the protection of water rights, given the different needs that they
face it is likely that rural areas will continue being under-protected. Even more, community
leaders in rural areas focus their efforts on designing and managing their own systems to
have access to water, rather than using legal documents to push local and departmental
authorities (Interviewees # 5 and 7) [55] This shows the disconnect between the needs and
realities of water management in rural areas and the political debates in Congress.
4.4. Political Control
Congress exerts its role of political control by calling on debates or public hearings (in
front of committees or the chamber) on issues that are affecting the country (Art. 135 numb
3, 6, and 8). These debates are proposed by Congress members and need approval from
the head of each committee or the chamber. Both the Senado and Cámara have permanent
commissions that focus on environmental issues, agriculture, land rights, and the regulation
of water sources (rivers and oceans) [58,59]. They are identified as Commission Fifth on
each chamber.
In our interviews with advisers to Congress members they highlighted the relevance
of this role of political control from the perspective that legislative changes take a long time
to take place, while political control might stop permanent harm to the environment: Quite
often, Congress is not the one that is going to make normative structural changes, but it
is the one that can prevent imminent danger in the destruction of ecosystems, so in other
words, Congress will not score the goals, but it will stop the goals from ‘anti-environment’
governments (Interviewee # 8).
In this quote, the statement that Congress is not the one to make structural changes
refers to the slowness of legislative processes. One of the interviewees expressed their
frustration because they might not be working with Congress by the time some of legislative
changes they have been working toward are approved: “And so based on my experience a
key role from Congress, regardless of whether the President is anti or pro-environment,
is the role of political control and the role of environmental litigation.” (Interviewee # 8).
This interviewee mentioned environmental litigation as another strategic behavior from
Congress members who have appeared as amicus in environmental litigation or specifically
in cases to protect the right to water.
In this section we analyze examples of political control exerted by Congress in relation
to the right to water with the goal of exploring whether relevant water conflicts have been
addressed. There is not a centralized database of political control debates held in Congress
which posed a challenge in the identification of relevant hearings or the analysis of how
water issues have reached the floor. In our interviews with advisers to Congress members
and a researcher in water issues we identified a common theme: water conflicts rarely
make it to the floor as the main topic of a debate. Instead, water conflicts are addressed
in connection to what seems like more salient topics, particularly land rights or economic
activities (like tourism or agriculture) (Interviewees # 4, 7, 8, and 9).
An example of a debate that focused on land rights took place on 22 September 2020
when the Fifth Commission of Senado debated the application for an environmental license
for the Quebradona copper-gold mining project by AngloGold Ashanti in Antioquia that
would affect two municipalities (Támesis and Jericó). This debate was proposed by the
senator Jorge Enrique Robledo (from the Polo Democrático party) and he requested the
government deny the license for this project arguing that landowners are entitled to specific
rights and one of them is to decide what they want to do with their territory: “Mining
projects are not sustainable, they end, and when they do they generate a social and economic
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catastrophe in the area” [60]. In this debate the Minister for Mining and Energy presented
an opposed thesis arguing that mining is a key area for the economic re-activation of the
country and that a very small portion of the land in the country (only 0.2%) is being used
for mining [60]. This mining project, as many others, is posing serious threats on water
sources in these municipalities and the National Agency for Environmental Licensing and
Permitting (ANLA for its acronym in Spanish) is still analyzing the case.
In our interviews we identified a case that has been considered a success from the
perspective of being one of the few cases related to the right to water that was debated
by the Senado (Interviewee # 7, Interviewee # 8, Interviewee # 9). It is the case of a mining
project in the Santurbán Paramo. What makes this case unique is that it is one of the few
debates that was filed as a water case and it was approved in the agenda for the Senado.
How did this case make it to the floor? In the next paragraphs we will describe aspects of
this case.
Saturbán Paramo is a ridge located between the departments of Santander and Norte
de Santander, with an extension of 351 acres and an altitude between 9200 and 14,000 ft
above sea level. Over 40 municipalities get their water from this paramo [61]. The national
government has not provided for essential services in this area for a long time: poor road
development, little infrastructure for schools, healthcare, and public health, as well as
public health problems such as high levels of unemployment and alcoholism are some of
the struggles in the area [61]. There have been two attempts to start mining exploitation in
the area: one in 2009 and one 2019.
On 23 December 2009 Greystar applied to the Ministry of Environment to get a license
of exploitation for gold and silver in this area. The director of the water company in
Bucaramanga (the largest city in the area) reached out to the community and several
organizations highlighting the risks that this license would pose for the community and
for water sources. Later, unions joined efforts with nonprofit organizations in the area to
attract stakeholders in the community [62] p. 120. People in the area organized themselves
to oppose Greystar.
The peak of this social movement unfolded between 2011 and 2012 when several
marches took place in different cities around the area, particularly Bucaramanga. In the
most representative march, over 100,000 people marched to protect water resources [61]. A
key aspect of this movement is the development of a narrative based on the symbology of
water as a fragile, empathetic, and being in need of protection by the community [61]. In
2011 ANLA denied the license to Greystar (later called Eco Oro) to explode the area. Later
on in 2016 the World Bank withdrew its support to this firm, which led to the removal of
all projects in the area [61].
In 2019 a second application for a license was filed and the community kept mobilizing
to oppose this project. On 6 October 2020, Senado held a debate and requested the govern-
ment to deny the license of this project [63]. This hearing was requested by 16 Senators
from different political parties and all of them signed the position that the license should
be denied. It is interesting that in their interventions only four senators (Richard Aguilar,
Griselda Lobo, Milla Romero Soto, Guillermo García Realpe, and Gustavo Bolivar) referred
to “water” or protecting water sources in the paramo. Romero Soto highlighted that 70% of
water in the country comes from paramos, which highlights the importance of protecting
them. Other arguments that were addressed by senators are summarized in Table 5.
It is noticeable that although the core of this case is the protection of the paramo the
right to water was not mentioned. Also, key water challenges like equitable access to water
or water quality were absent from the debate (Relatoría Senado, Debate de control político en
defensa del Páramo de Santurbán, 6 October 2020).
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Table 5. Summary of topics debated by the Fifth Commission of the Senate. Debate about the Santurbán Paramo, 6 October
2020. Designed by authors.
Topic Description
Environmental protection
When Congress requests reports on the environmental impact of mining projects,
the government answers that projects with licenses have passed the environmental
checks but it is not clear what that really means.
Mining
• Need to safeguard environmental sustainability.
• Need to develop a comprehensive plan to protect paramos in Colombia.
• Need to regulate it.
• Negative impact against paramos.
• Need to update the Code for Mining in Colombia.
• Artisan miners are essential parties in these conversations.
Sustainable development
• It is essential to identify economic activities different from mining that could
benefit the regions. Also, it is important to deny this license but what kind of
support will the government offer to those people whose livelihood depends
on mining?
• Need to articulate efforts with the Ministry for Agriculture making sure that
farmers are engaged in the protection of paramos.
Delimitation of protected areas • It is necessary to set clear and fair boundaries in the protection of paramos.• Land rights.
Litigation against the Colombian government
• The Colombian government is facing 13 lawsuits ($54 million USD approx.
involved in these cases) in international courts. The government should not
accept international litigation clauses in these contracts.
COVID and social participation
Communities who would be affected by this project have been participating
actively and pushing against mining projects. There is little availability of internet
connection in these areas. During the COVID pandemic hearings are held online
and the community will not have accessibility to engage.
5. Discussion
Whether Congress is an effective channel for water conflicts offers a mixed answer.
The slowness of the legislative process as well as the shyness of Congress members to
engage in deep water conflicts in Colombia depict a picture of a legislative that is not
effectively addressing water conflicts. At the same time, addressing water conflicts in
Colombia will require the articulation of efforts from the executive and the legislative
branches around a comprehensive and incremental plan with the goal of ensuring that
people in the country have access to water. Some efforts have been conducted along these
lines, particularly via political control, but there is still a long way to go before Congress
becomes an open forum that effectively addresses water conflicts. In this section we will
unpack these findings and discuss them in light of relevant literature.
The role of Congress in water conflicts can be analyzed from the perspective of
the issues that have made it to the floor either via a legislative debate (with the goal of
passing a bill or constitutional reform) and those that have made it to the floor via political
control. From the legislative perspective, the bills and constitutional reforms that have
been discussed by the Congress in the last 30 years address some of the water conflicts
that we noticed in the literature. For example, the regulation and protection of the human
right to water has been the topic of discussion in nine proposed bills and constitutional
reforms, yet they have not passed. A similar situation has occurred with the free minimum
access to drinking water that has been discussed in five legislative documents, but none
of these initiatives has been successful (two of them are pending for debate in the Senate).
A key water conflict in Colombia is the negative impact of mining on water sources and
communities’ sustainable access to water. Only three proposed bills have been filed for
debate; two of them drowned, while one is pending for debate.
Overall, only three bills have passed. One of them (Bill 1176 of 2007) addresses the
key topic of the inequalities among regions when it comes to access to resources for water
provision. This bill, along with Bill 1977 of 2019, focus on the SGP (national budget transfers
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system) [57], and assume that the national government is an adequate arbiter for assigning
resources from departments with more resources to those who have less. Although this is
an attempt to address inequalities in the system of water provision in the country, it is not
enough to safeguard that populations in rural areas or communities with less resources will
have access to water. To this extent, legislative efforts in Congress have not been effective.
The case of the constitutional reform filed in 2016 that aimed to constitutionalize the
right to water is one of the most noticeable ones because of the broad social support that
it gathered and the negative legislative reaction that it faced. One of our interviewees
described the legislative process in detail: “In 2016 it got filed and since this is a proposed
constitutional reform, well it requires eight debates and it saw until the seventh debate.
Really, it was approved by almost all Congress members, despite the Ministry [of Environ-
ment] that was not in agreement during the first debates on the seventh debate the text got
published, it was at Senado. It went its course, really it takes a while to pass from Senado to
Cámara so we were tight on time, and when the time came to schedule the eighth debate
the president of the committee who was Telésforo Pedraza [from the Conservative Party]
he called for the debate . . . well, he never called Congress members for that meeting. In
other words, all Congress members showed up but since he did not formally schedule the
meeting, well, the amendment drowned” (Interviewee # 1).
This quote describes in detail how agenda setting has been a key issue in Congress’
channeling and filtering water conflicts. Openly, Congress members do not express their
disagreement with water conflicts, but procedural rules are not followed, or debates do not
get scheduled, and initiatives drown.
Another factor described in this quote is the resistance of the government to these
initiatives that contribute to the drowning of water bills. Another interviewee described
how the government does not only oppose laws and constitutional reforms that protect the
right to water, but they also mentioned that the government exerts other efforts that erode
the legal environment for water protection (Interviewee # 7). This interviewee mentioned
the example of recent efforts by the government to pass a bill protecting paramos, in
connection to the social movement of Santurbán Paramo. A bill of paramos already exists
so these efforts by the government rather than being effective mechanisms of protection
are “populists attempts” to gain citizen support (Interviewee # 7).
Furthermore, an interviewee described how the government signals Congress when
some bills or issues are of special interest of the executive, but not all these “signals” mean
the same thing. Some of these signals are meant to be symbolic, to show the public that the
government is paying attention to relevant issues, but that at the end of the day there is not
a real commitment to solve them. Some others are real signals that the government has
special interest in certain topics and that the executive wants to work with Congress on
them. Water issues tend to be in the first category of signals (Interviewee # 9).
A key concern on the role of Congress is how slow the legislative process is and
whether it is capable of formulating prompt solutions to serious and immediate problems
that the population is facing, and water conflicts are a good example of this. One of
our interviewees recognized that the Congress might not provide effective solutions to
address these issues, but it can exert pressure to prevent other organs from harming
the environment or the right to water (Interviewee # 9). This interviewee provided two
examples of mechanisms that Congress uses in its role of “goalie” of environmental conflicts.
The first mechanism is litigation when Congress members file amicus curiae to support
relevant lawsuits against the government in environmental cases.
The second mechanism focuses on the opposition that Congress members can pose to
bills presented by the government when they include articles that affect the right to water.
In this case, Interviewee # 9 emphasized that some of these bills do not focus on water
issues directly, but that they include topics that pose serious harm to water sources or to
water distribution. For example, the law that regulates royalties caused by the exploitation
of natural resources. The government presented this bill that included an article stating
that if fracking projects were approved, these companies would not have been required to
Water 2021, 13, 1214 21 of 26
pay the regular fees for royalties, but just 60% of these fees [64]. By reducing the royalties
for these companies, the government aimed to offer an incentive for this economic activity,
regardless of the negative impact that fracking causes on the environment, particularly
water sources.
Both from the perspective of the legislative function and the political control function,
whether water conflicts receive attention from Congress varies depending on several factors.
Based on interview data we identified the following factors (see Table 6).
Table 6. Factors that affect whether water conflicts are debated in Congress. Interview data. Designed by the authors.
Factor Description
Number of people affected The more people affected, the more likely it is for Congress to pay attentionElectoral motivation for Congress members
Economic interests at stake






The higher the economic interests, the more likely it is for Congress to pay attention
Social conflicts of social movements in the area
Social mobilization
Violence against social leaders
The more intense social dynamics in the area
Conflicts that affect larger numbers of people are more likely to receive attention
from Congress; this is the case of Santurbán Paramo. This case reached Congress via
political control because Congress members noticed the social mobilization and campaign
led by activists in the area. This could be a good example of legislative representation of
issues of social relevance, but at the same time it has meant that some water issues that
have not reached the same salience are more likely to be ignored by Congress members
(Interviewee # 7, Interviewee # 8, and Interviewee # 9). It is possible that a serious case of
water contamination affects water sources, but if there is not electoral capital involved this
issue is not likely to reach the Congress’ agenda (Interviewee # 9).
Another criterion is whether there are economic interests at stake. An example of
this factor is the navigability of the most important river in Colombia, the Magdalena
river. The clean-up process of the Magdalena river caught the attention of the Senate’s
committee on territory development. This debate held on 19 June 2020 focused on exerting
political control over the contract subscribed for the clean-up, particularly because of
the commercial implications of this process [65]. The focus of this debate was economic
development and the need to improve navigability of the river.
Finally, the presence of social conflicts or social movements in relation to the water
conflict increases the possibilities of Congress addressing the issue. An example of this
category is the debate held by the Social Policy Committee of the Senate (29 April 2014)
on the humanitarian crisis in la Guajira. La Guajira is a region in the north of Colombia
with dramatic problems of access to public utilities, corruption, and lack of resources. This
particular debate took place as a consequence of the death of almost 300 Wayuu children
due to malnutrition, lack of healthcare, and access to clean water [66–68]. This dramatic
social conflict has unfolded over time and is a key water conflict in Colombia that despite
receiving the attention of Congress has yet to be solved.
These factors increase the likelihood for an issue to receive Congress’ attention, but as
the examples reveal, this does not necessarily mean that they will be effectively addressed.
Although the legislative Colombian system has mechanisms in place so Congress members
representing their constituents have the power to propose bills or call on debates for
political control in any topic they deem relevant, Congress members have not taken the
initiative to protect water rights. In terms of what Hilson [33] described as the openness of
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the system, the Colombian legislative system is theoretically open but in reality there are
broad elites that have been undermining the possibilities of water legislation to pass.
Our data show a limited role of Congress in the protection of the right to water
in Colombia. In light of this pessimistic perspective, the question is whether Congress
is the institution that should address water conflicts or whether there are other public
organizations (e.g., courts, mayors, or governors) who would be more willing (or more
effective) at addressing these issues. Furthermore, it is possible to argue that public
agents such as mayors are closer to water conflicts and local needs, and consequently
that they can provide more effective solutions. We disagree with this perspective. Taking
into consideration that water inequalities and access to clean water are common and
serious problems for Colombians (particularly for those living in rural and indigenous
communities) it is essential to address these issues with an institutionalized solution in the
body of general policy that prioritizes water rights.
In the Colombian context courts have had a pivotal role in rights protection and
particularly in the protection of the right to water. They have provided remedies on a
case to case basis and have also solved conflicts that affect particular communities via
collective litigation. While these remedies have been highly relevant, the role of formulating
policies and approving appropriate budget to support them belongs to Congress and to the
executive. Courts like the Constitutional Court and the Council of State have opened up the
door for citizens to get partial relief via tutela or collective litigation, but it is possible that
this has fostered a comfortable position for Congress to keep water issues of the political
agenda. While courts have operated as a release valve for social pressures, strong economic
and political pressures have made it so that it is not attractive for the legislative to engage
in water governance. Further research will be necessary to assess this hypothesis and to
explore whether courts could spurt more action from Congress.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we set out to answer the question: has the Colombian Congress been
effective at addressing relevant water conflicts and making them visible? Congress is the
institution that holds the ‘power of the purse’ and the structural reforms needed to assign
responsibilities to state institutions and decide over budgetary changes to make access
to water possible, including in small peripheral municipalities, need to be passed by the
legislative branch. We find that despite social mobilization, those reforms have not taken
place. Besides, framing the semantic field of the right to water is needed to determine the
minimum obligations of public authorities and other actors, which is also a pending task
that must be carried out by the legislative branch.
We studied legal and constitutional reform attempts debated by Congress since 1991.
We studied these bills and constitutional amendments as part of a process of social political
struggle, where actors in the political society use the national parliament as an arena to
advance or block a contested political goal. They have not succeeded.
We find that the Colombian political system is structurally open to this type of legal
reform for advancing water rights, but water does not make it easily to the political
agenda because environmental harm is not central to the work of any political party,
nor of Congress representatives, and because Colombian legislators respond not only to
their constituents but also to the interests of market actors. Strong lobby to favor private
contractors (particularly in mining) and concerns from the executive due to fear of litigation
have triggered Congress’ inaction when it comes to deep water conflicts in the country.
National development plans have favored extractive economies, and this ideologically
clashes with reform to enhance water protection for all.
Concerning the bills presented since 1991, some have addressed relevant water con-
flicts, such the regulation of infrastructure for sustainable water usage in all new buildings,
or the creation of free minimum amount of water for the most vulnerable populations,
but other bills (the bulk of the data set) only capture superficial water conflicts that do
not reflect deep water problems and inequalities. Not even these have passed. Only three
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water relevant bills have been passed by Congress since 1991. One of them imposed the
obligation of developing plans for water conservation on mayors and governors, while the
other two regulate budgetary issues pertaining to funds towards water and sewage.
For political parties we find that water is not reflected in their statutes as programmatic
priorities. Yet, the recent Santurbán Paramo case shows that public opinion around big-
scale mining in fragile ecosystems is becoming an influence in Congress people’s choices,
even of representatives who are members of parties that favor a vision of water as a
commodity rather than as right. We see the notion of dynamic representation starting to
play a role in legislative politics in Colombia.
Finally, in channeling water conflicts, we find that the Congress—as is the tendency
in other Latin American legislative branches—has been ‘reactive’ more than ‘proactive’.
Only a few water bills have been proposed by legislators and the structural reforms
needed to realize the water rights of all, and especially of marginalized groups, have not
passed. Congress representatives have not ‘scored goals’ for water rights through their
legislative function, but through the political control function have managed to stop some
anti water-rights reforms. We conclude that the Colombian Congress has not been effective
at addressing relevant water conflicts through legal and constitutional reform. Yet, it has
given some late visibility to critical and over escalated territorial conflicts of which water is
a key element.
Two questions arise from these findings. First, what factors affect Congress’ action
or inaction in water conflicts? We find that the answer is twofold. On the one hand,
Congress is more likely to address water issues if they are brought to the floor and framed
as “something else” (e.g., land issues, encouraging economic reactivation, etc.). This shows
a strategic behavior from legislators to avoid water conflicts. On the other hand, when the
issue is brought to Congress as a matter of water governance, there are three factors that
increase their likelihood to make it to the political agenda: the number of people affected
with the conflict, economic interests at stake, and whether social movements are involved.
The second question is whether these behaviors speak of the nature of Congress
as an institution or the nature of the right to water. Our data show evidence that both
types of factors are stake. The institutional dynamics between Congress, the executive,
and the courts in rights’ protection have led to a passive role of the legislative, allowing
courts to take a lead role. Also, taking into consideration that most legislative changes
take a full legislature to succeed, social actors have turned to the courts or to bureaucratic
organizations to search for answers. At the same time, the nature of the right to water
has allowed social actors to act strategically and look for remedies in other areas where
governmental institutions are more receptive (e.g., public health, a healthy environment,
land issues, or encouraging economic reactivation).
These dynamics are shared to Latin American countries and it is our hope that our
findings open paths for future research in other countries and at the comparative level.
One key aspect for future exploration is whether the role of courts in different countries
encourages a more active role of the legislative. In the Colombian case of water protection,
it would seem like an active role of courts has allowed for Congress to remain passive, but
more research is needed to confirm this hypothesis. Another aspect for future research is
whether more collaborative approaches of decision-making in water rights permeate water
governance in Latin America. It remains to be seen if the increasing global mobilization
for environmental protection in the context of the climate crisis will influence dynamic
representation changes in the legislative branch. As 69% of Colombian municipalities
lack water without risk for human consumption and the poorest municipalities have less
access to potable water without any level of risk, social mobilization around water rights is
increasing. Enough public opinion pressure could trigger modifications of the budgetary
restrictions in place so far unchanged by the democratic institution holding the ‘power of
the purse.’
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